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FOREWORD: LESSONS FROM THE SADDAM TRIAL
Michael P. Scharf
I. INTRODUCTION
The emerging system of international criminal justice is composed
of a spectrum of institutions, from purely international courts (such as the
International Criminal Court and the ad hoc international criminal tribunals
for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia) to hybrid international-domestic
tribunals (such as the ad hoc Court for East Timor, the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia)
to purely domestic courts and war crimes commissions. A recent addition to
that list that falls somewhere between hybrid tribunals and domestic courts
is the so-called "internationalized domestic tribunal," exemplified by the
Bosnian War Crimes Chamber in Sarajevo and the Iraqi High Tribunal
(IHT) in Baghdad.
The IHT merits characterization as an internationalized domestic
tribunal because its statute and rules of procedure are modeled on the U.N.
war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone,
and its statute provides that the IHT is to be guided by the precedent of the
U.N. tribunals and that its judges and prosecutors are to be assisted by inter-
national experts.1 But the IHT is not fully international or even international
enough to be dubbed a hybrid court, since it is seated in Baghdad, its prose-
cutor is Iraqi, it uses the Iraqi Criminal Code to supplement the provisions
of its statute and rules, and its bench is composed exclusively of Iraqi
judges.
Internationalized domestic tribunals are seen as a potentially vital
supplement to the International Criminal Court, which lacks the resources
- Michael Scharf is Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick K. Cox International
Law Center at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. From 2004 to 2005, he was
part of the international team assembled by the International Bar Association that provided
training to the judges of the Iraqi High Tribunal. In 2006, Prof. Scharf led the first training
session for the judges and prosecutors of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cam-
bodia. Prof Scharf is the co-author of Saddam on Trial: Understanding and Debating the
Iraqi High Tribunal (Carolina Academic Press, 2006), available at http://www.cap-
press.com/books/1625.
1 The English translation of the IHT Statute is available at http://law.case.edu/
grotian-moment-blog/documents/ISTstatuteofficial english.pdf. The English translation of
the IHT Rules of Procedure and Evidence is available at http://law.case.edu/
grotian-moment-blog/documents/ISTrules_procedure-evidence.pdf.
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and personnel to prosecute all but a tiny portion of cases in situations where
the domestic system is unable or unwilling to do so. As one of the first in-
ternationalized domestic tribunals, the perceived success or failure of the
IHT is likely to have an affect on the future use of that model of interna-
tional justice.
Unfortunately, the IHT was snake-bitten from its conception. Many
countries, international organizations, and human rights NGOs opposed the
IHT from the start because it followed an invasion that they believed to be
unlawful, provided for the death penalty, and was seen as preventing de-
ployment of a truly international court. And then, once the Dujail trial be-
gan, the proceedings were marred by the assassination of three defense
counsel, the resignation of the presiding judge, the boycott of the defense
team, the disruptive conduct of the defendants, and finally by an execution
that everyone agrees was an utter fiasco. In light of all that went awry, at-
tempting to provide an objective appraisal of the IHT is a bit like assessing
the tragic evening of April 14, 1865 by inquiring, "Well, other than that,
Mrs. Lincoln, how did you enjoy the show?"
But an objective assessment of the IHT would have to acknowledge
that there were in fact some positive aspects as well. For example, the IHT
Statute and Rules represent a novel attempt to blend international standards
of due process with Middle Eastern legal traditions. It is particularly note-
worthy that the Dujail trial was the first-ever televised criminal proceeding
in the Middle East, enabling millions of people throughout the region to see
the process of justice unfold, warts and all. While the judges of the IHT
might not have followed every provision of the tribunal's internationally-
inspired Statute and Rules as scrupulously as they should have, the judges
bent over backward to grant Saddam Hussein the right to personally cross-
examine his accusers and make statements to the bench-an opportunity he
took advantage of thirty-nine times during the trial. And while the media
reported that the court-appointed public defenders who represented the de-
fendants while their retained lawyers boycotted most of the trial were not up
to the task, in fact they were ably assisted by a distinguished British judge
who had previously served as defense counsel in cases before the Yugosla-
via and Rwanda tribunals. The four-hour closing argument delivered by the
public defenders was particularly impressive and ultimately led to the ac-
quittal of one of the seven Dujail defendants and relatively light sentences
for three others.
Most importantly, the 298-page, single-spaced opinion of the Trial
Chamber,2 which was issued on November 22, 2006, meticulously de-
2 An English translation of the Iraqi High Tribunal's Dujail Trial Opinion and the Ap-
peals Chamber Opinion are available in the appendix of this journal. 39 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L., apps. A, B (2007).
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scribed the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, with numerous
citations to the past decisions of international tribunals. To assist the judges
in preparing their opinion, the U.S. Embassy's Regime Crimes Liaison Of-
fice provided translations of the major war crimes judgments of our time,
from Nuremberg to The Hague-the first time this body of jurisprudence
has ever been made available in Arabic.
The trial chamber's opinion-the first fifty-four pages of which are
devoted to responding to the numerous motions and arguments of the de-
fense counsel-addresses many of the objections of the tribunal's critics.
For example, the opinion convincingly explains why recusal of the presid-
ing judge was not warranted. While the defense team has publicly com-
plained that it did not have access to all of the evidence in a timely manner,
the opinion documents that both the defense and prosecution were provided
the entire dossier prepared by the investigative judge, containing all of the
evidence the judges considered in arriving at their verdict, three months
before the trial commenced.
The opinion also explains that the assassinations of the three de-
fense counsel could have been prevented if the three had accepted the secu-
rity measures that protected the judges, witnesses, prosecutors, and the rest
of the one hundred-member defense team. And throughout, the opinion ap-
plies the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard, which should mollify critics
who had complained that this standard was not explicitly provided for in the
IHT Statute or Rules.
Two points stand out in the Dujail Trial Chamber opinion for estab-
lishing noteworthy legal precedent. First, Saddam's main defense was that
as a leader, he was entitled to take action against a town that had tried to
assassinate him and was populated by insurgents and terrorists allied with
Iran at a time when Iraq and Iran were at war. The opinion details why the
actions taken against the town of Dujail and its inhabitants "was not neces-
sary to stop an immediate and imminent danger" and how the actions were
disproportionate to the threat. In this way, the opinion makes clear that there
is a line to be drawn in every country's fight against terrorism and that Sad-
dam Hussein and his co-defendants crossed that line. Second, it is signifi-
cant that the opinion begins with the case against Awad al-Bandar, the
president of Saddam's Revolutionary Court, who was charged with using
his court as a weapon by conducting an "illusionary trial" and then ordering
the execution of 148 villagers of Dujail, including several individuals who
were under eighteen years of age. Ironically, al-Bandar was convicted of
doing the very thing critics have accused the IHT of doing: presiding over a
trial devoid of due process of law. But the many details of the case against
Al-Bandar contained in the Dujail Trial Chamber opinion make it clear how
fundamentally different the IHT is from Saddam Hussein's Revolutionary
Courts. In any event, the legal analysis of the case against al-Bandar will
serve as an important warning to judges in Iraq and elsewhere that they, too,
2006-20071
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may face prosecution if they stray from the internationally recognized fair
trial requirements.
These may seem like modest accomplishments in light of all that
went wrong during the Dujail trial, but in assessing the IHT, one must rec-
ognize that there were no other feasible alternatives for bringing Saddam
Hussein to justice after his capture in 2003. While many of us would have
preferred an international venue, that option was not on the table in 2003 for
a variety of reasons. The newly-established International Criminal Court
was not available for the trial of Saddam Hussein because of the "non-
retroactivity" clause in its Statute, prohibiting the court from trying cases
that arose before June 2002. A Security Council-created ad hoc tribunal was
not a possibility because France, Russia, and China let it be known that they
would veto any effort to establish such a tribunal for Iraq since they felt the
U.S. invasion had been unlawful. Simply turning Saddam Hussein over to
the ordinary Iraqi courts, on the other hand, was not seen as a viable option
either, since the Iraqi judiciary had been left in shambles after three decades
of Ba'athist rule.
Some have suggested that the success of the IHT should be judged
by how well it has contributed to peace and the transition to democracy in
Iraq. Admittedly, in the short term, the tribunal has not proven to be an ef-
fective mechanism for reconciliation. In fact the month following Saddam
Hussein's execution has been the bloodiest since the invasion in 2003. But
history suggests that that is not a fair benchmark for judging a war crimes
tribunal. Indeed, recently declassified opinion polls which were conducted
by the U.S. Department of State from 1946 through 1958 indicated that over
eighty percent of the West German people did not believe the findings of
the Nuremberg tribunal and considered the Nuremberg proceedings to be
nothing but "acts of political retribution without firm legal basis." By 1953,
the State Department had concluded that the Nuremberg Trials had com-
pletely failed to "reeducate" West Germans.3
Similarly, Security Council Resolution 827, which established the
Yugoslavia tribunal, stated that war crimes prosecutions would contribute to
the restoration of peace in the region. However, during Milosevic's four-
year trial (2002-2006), rather than being discredited the former Serb
leader's popularity soared. Polls conducted during the trial indicated that
seventy-five percent of Serbs believed Milosevic was not receiving a fair
trial, and sixty-six percent did not believe that he was responsible for war
crimes. At mid-trial, campaigning from the courtroom in The Hague, Mil-
osevic won a seat in the Serb Parliament in a landslide election.4 The lesson
3 PETER MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 241, 246 (2000).
4 Andre Purvis, Star Power in Serbia: Slobodan Milosevic's Performance at his War
Crimes Trial has Won Him Increased Popularity at Home, TIME, Sept. 30, 2002, at 46; Gary
J. Bass, Milosevic in the Hague, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2003, at 82.
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from the Nuremberg and Yugoslavia tribunals is that war crimes trials have
always been and are likely always to be divisive, at least in the short term.
No matter the strength of the evidence that is presented in the courtroom,
and no matter how many people watch the proceedings, those that support
the defendants will continue to support them and perceive the proceedings
as unfair.
Others have suggested that the IHT should be judged harshly be-
cause its first trial was one of the messiest in legal history. Major war
crimes trials are inherently messy. War crimes defendants and their lawyers
seldom play by the court's rules, desiring instead to transform the proceed-
ings into political theatre. None of the major war crimes trials to date have
been praised as a model of fairness, efficiency, or decorum. Indeed, at the
conclusion of the Nuremberg trial, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone pub-
licly castigated the Nuremberg proceedings "as a high grade lynching
party." 5 In a speech to Congress that was subsequently reproduced with
admiration in John F. Kennedy's Pulitzer Prize-winning book, Profiles of
Courage, Senator Robert Taft of Ohio harshly criticized every aspect of the
Nuremberg project. 6
Fifty-five years later, the Slobodan Milosevic trial before the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was similarly subject
to widespread criticism, including suspicions surrounding the timing of the
indictment (in the middle of the NATO bombing campaign), the manner of
Milosevic's surrender (in violation of a judicial order by the Serb Supreme
Court), the tribunal's decision to allow the defendant to represent himself
(enabling him to disrupt and hijack the proceedings), the judges demeanor
(the presiding judge often yelled at the defendant), the replacement of the
presiding judge who had fallen ill with a judge who had not been present for
the first two years of the proceedings, and the fact that the defendant him-
self died before the conclusion of the trial.7
It is often said that just as courts try cases, so too do cases try
courts. As the first trial before the Iraqi High Tribunal, the Dujail case was
the test-run for this novel judicial institution. Clearly it had a bumpy start,
but judged in light of the unique challenges that the IHT faced, the fact that
there were no feasible alternatives available for trying Saddam Hussein, and
that war crimes trials are historically divisive and messy, the IHT cannot
simply be written off as an utter failure.
5 GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS 25 (2000).
6 JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 231-44 (1964).
7 See Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial, in BRINGING POWER TO
JUSTICE 25, 25-46 (Joanna Harrington, Michael Milde, & Richard Verdonn, eds.) (2006).
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II. "LESSONS FROM THE SADDAM TRIAL"
After the Nuremberg trial sixty years ago, Chief Prosecutor Robert
Jackson reported to President Truman that despite the many errors and mis-
steps that occurred during the proceedings, he was consoled by the fact that
the lessons from the WWII war crimes tribunal would be instructive for the
future.8 In this spirit, on October 6-7, 2006, the Frederick K. Cox Center at
Case Western Reserve University School of Law hosted an international
conference and experts meeting entitled "Lessons from the Saddam Trial."
The October 2006 Saddam trial conference was organized by a pro-
gram committee consisting of Professor Michael Newton of Vanderbilt
University; Professor William Schabas, Director of the Irish Centre for Hu-
man Rights at the National University of Ireland in Galway; Mark Ellis,
Executive Director of the International Bar Association headquartered in
London, and myself. The conference was co-sponsored by the International
Bar Association and the Irish Centre for Human Rights and was designated
a Centennial Regional Meeting of the American Society of International
Law, a Regional Conference of the International Law Association (Ameri-
can Branch), and the Annual Meeting of the International Association of
Penal Law (American National Section).
The October 2006 Saddam trial conference included a keynote ad-
dress and six panels: (1) "Preparing for the Mother of All Trials", (2) "Or-
der in the Courtroom: The Challenges of Trying a Tyrant", (3) "Debate: Did
Saddam Get a Fair Trial?", (4) "Saddam on Stage: Assessing the Media
Coverage of the Trial", (5) "Lessons Learned from the Dujail Trial: A
Cross-Fire Panel", and (6) "Was the Dujail Trial One of the Trials of the
Century?" In addition to a number of leading academics, the two dozen ex-
pert participants included the ambassador of Iraq to the United States, the
executive director of Human Rights Watch, CNN International and Court
TV Saddam Trial expert commentators, the former Director of the Regime
Crimes Liaison Office, a fair trial observer who sat through the Dujail trial
in Baghdad, the deputy director of the State Department Office for War
Crimes Issues, the former chief prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, the senior legal advisor to the Chambers of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda, the former principal public defender of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, and the former chair of the Drafting Committee for
the International Criminal Court.
This special double issue of the Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law contains eight articles generated from the October 2006
Saddam trial conference, which makes a significant contribution to the lit-
8 ROBERT H. JACKSON, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (October 7, 1946), quoted in MICHAEL
P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG, at 3 (1997).
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erature on war crimes tribunals. It also contains transcripts of the debate on
whether Saddam Hussein received a fair trial and the "cross-fire" panel dis-
cussion of the lessons learned from the Dujail trial. In addition, we have
included, as an appendix to the double-issue, the English translations of the
Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion and Appeals Chamber Opinion.
Although the views of the individuals who participated in the Octo-
ber Saddam trial conference diverged on many points, they all agreed that
much can be learned from the way the Dujail trial unfolded, and that these
lessons can help improve the way the Iraqi High Tribunal tackles its upcom-
ing trials, as well as the way the international community can help domestic
prosecutions of former leaders accused of atrocities in other parts of the
world. To that end, the day following the conference many of the experts
participated in a day-long experts meeting, which resulted in a document
titled "Ten Lessons from the Saddam Trial" (appended below). While not
specifically endorsed by the participants, this document reflects the general
points of consensus that emerged from the meeting.
I am extremely grateful to my program committee colleagues for
their help in organizing this ambitious project, and to our distinguished pan-
elists for their participation in the "Lessons from the Saddam Trial" confer-
ence and contributing to this symposium issue of the Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law. My appreciation also goes out to the student
editors of this volume who worked diligently on the preparation of this pub-
lication.
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APPENDIX
TEN LESSONS FROM THE SADDAM TRIAL
Generated from the October 7, 2006 Cleveland Experts Meeting
Chaired by Michael Scharf
Co-Rapporteurs: Gregory McNeal, Christopher Rass, &
Brianne Draffin
Lesson # 1: There should be a presumption against undertaking domes-
tic war crimes trials in countries languishing in a conflict environment.
The International Criminal Court's "complementarity regime" re-
flects international recognition that domestic trials have advantages over
international trials and are to be preferred unless the national courts are un-
able or unwilling to prosecute. At the same time, it must be recognized that
in the best of circumstances, undertaking international war crimes trials is
arduous; in a country plagued by sectarian violence and devoid of reliable
security mechanisms, the premature launching of such a trial can be reckless
and potentially futile. It also runs the risk of negating the potential benefits
to the broader criminal law system. In such circumstances, a more responsi-
ble and viable option may have been to utilize a neutral jurisdiction, pref-
erably in the relevant region. In the current IHT trials, extreme and immedi-
ate steps must be taken to guarantee the protection of defense counsel, as
well as the judges, prosecutors, and witnesses-whether they desire such
protection or not.
Lesson #2: Post-conflict countries that undertake domestic war crimes
trials need unbiased international assistance.
Referring to the Iraqi High Tribunal as a domestic court is a mis-
nomer. Behind the scenes, the United States played a crucial role in drafting
the tribunal's Statute, collecting evidence to be used by the prosecution, and
providing both security and financing to the tribunal. Although the United
States, as an occupying force, should not have been the one to unilaterally
play this role, international assistance for a domestic war crimes tribunal
following the fall of an authoritarian regime is indispensable. In the future,
transitional justice should be a key goal that attracts legal and administrative
support from across the international spectrum. Serious consideration
should be given to foregoing the death penalty as the price for obtaining
international support and involvement. The international community should
provide substantial training in international criminal law to jurists, including
defense attorneys, serving on domestic war crimes tribunals. An interna-
tional perspective on substantive and procedural law concerning crimes of
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genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity is essential, and interna-
tional best practices serve to supplement established domestic norms to pro-
vide an integrated model.
Lesson #3: Steps should be taken to further internationalize the Iraqi
High Tribunal.
Like the Statute of the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Article 3(5) of the IHT Statute provides for the appoint-
ment of one or more foreign judges to join the Iraqi judges on the bench, but
without explanation none were ever appointed. Such an appointment of a
distinguished Arabic-speaking judge from the region would greatly promote
the perception of the IHT as a fair and competent judicial institution, with-
out sacrificing the essential Iraqi character of the tribunal. In addition, the
Statute provides for the appointment of international advisers to assist the
judges, prosecutor, and defense team. To date, the identities of the non-U.S.
advisers working with the tribunal have been kept confidential for their pro-
tection, but this has led to the misperception that the only foreign advisers
are members of the U.S. Department of Justice Regime Crimes Liaison Of-
fice, which in turn makes the tribunal appear to be an American-controlled
enterprise. In future trials, more advisors selected by respected NGOs such
as the International Bar Association should be recruited to assist the tribu-
nal, and their contribution (if not their identities) needs to be made public.
Lesson #4: Steps should be taken to strengthen the independence of the
Iraqi High Tribunal.
An independent and impartial court is a fundamental prerequisite
for meeting international standards of fairness in a trial. Any appearance of
government influence is a damning indictment of a court's independence.
During the Saddam trial, there were several instances in which the govern-
ment made inappropriate comments and attempted to interfere with the pro-
ceedings. Article 4(4) of the IHT Statute, which provides that the Iraqi
Presidency Council may transfer judges from the IHT to the Higher Judicial
Council for any reason, should be amended. Judges should only be remov-
able for cause and only through a decision of the other IHT judges, not the
unfettered whim of the executive branch. In addition, Article 33, which pro-
vides that no person who was a member of the Ba'ath party shall serve as a
judge or other officer of the IHT, should be revised to make clear that re-
moval of judges on grounds of former Ba'ath party membership shall occur
only via the IHT's internal fact finding and disciplinary procedures.
Lesson #5: Domestic war crimes trials should be kept short and fo-
cused.
2006-2007]
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Domestic war crimes courts should be judicious in deciding the
charges brought against a defendant and in deciding the best sequence of
cases. The court must be very conscious of the balance between lengthy
delays needed to adequately prepare for trial and the rights of potential de-
fendants held for extended periods pending trial. The legal predisposition to
charge all the crimes attributable to an individual in one conglomerated case
can lead to excessively lengthy trials, while the practice of charging specific
situations will generally necessitate repetitive trials of senior officials. In
any event, the length of trial will be a critical factor in the public percep-
tions of the process. The IHT was correct in selecting, as its first case
against Saddam Hussein, a relatively straightforward incident of criminality.
The Dujail case was manageable and the documentary evidence was re-
markably strong, enabling the tribunal to narrow its focus. On the other
hand, Saddam Hussein's execution after the Dujail verdict deprived victims
of seeing him stand trial on other much more serious charges.
Lesson #6: Pre-trial motions need to be resolved as they arise.
Consistent with Iraqi and international law, Saddam's defense
counsel filed a series of motions addressing issues such as the impartiality
of the judges and access to witnesses and documents. One of the most glar-
ing shortcomings of the tribunal was its failure to articulate a response to
these motions until the final trial chamber opinion was issued at the end of
the Dujail trial. The court's silence significantly weakened its transparency
and undermined the credibility of the judicial process. In future trials, the
IHT should make it a practice to issue written opinions addressing such
issues as they arise, consistent with the normal practice of Iraqi courts and
the international war crimes tribunals. In addition, the IHT should maintain
a regularly updated list of all motions filed and all scheduling decisions.
Lesson #7: Domestic war crimes tribunals must utilize accepted tactics
to maintain control of the courtroom without trammeling on the rights
of the defense.
Trying former leaders is always a messy affair, especially when a
decision has been made to televise the proceedings gavel-to-gavel, and the
defendants have indicated an intention to disrupt the trial, distract public
attention from the evidence against them, and turn the televised trial into a
political stage. To ensure decorum and protect the integrity of the process,
the judges in a domestic war crimes trial should be prepared to take a num-
ber of steps, which have been undertaken successfully by other tribunals.
First, standby counsel should be appointed at the start of the trial.
They should be trained and assisted by international advisors. At the start of
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the trial, the judges should explain the purpose of standby counsel, release
general information about their qualifications and experience, and describe
the conditions in which they will be asked to take over for retained defense
counsel. The Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals and the Special Court for
the Sierra Leone successfully employed standby counsel. The very exis-
tence of such standby public defenders may deter misconduct by the de-
fense, since the defense lawyers know they can be replaced, if necessary, at
a moment's notice. In addition, if misconduct persists after due warning, the
tribunal should not hesitate to hold retained counsel in contempt of court
and subject them to appropriate disciplinary sanctions for conduct that
would merit such action in an ordinary court. In such cases, the presiding
judge needs to dispassionately explain in open court why the steps taken
were warranted.
Second, defendants must be warned that they will lose their right of
self-representation (or in the Iraqi context, their right to ask follow-up ques-
tions after their lawyers are finished questioning a witness) and may face
expulsion or other sanctions if they act disruptively or inappropriately in the
courtroom. Persistent disruption after such a warning should result in tem-
porary exclusion, followed by a calibrated response proportionate to the
degree and persistence of disruption. If the defendant is expelled from the
courtroom, he must be permitted to follow the courtroom proceedings and
be able to speak with counsel remotely via communications link.
Lesson #8: The IHT's appeals process must be sufficiently deliberative.
The timing and substance of the Appeals Chamber decision was one
of the most controversial aspects of the Dujail trial. The IHT should main-
tain a verbatim written transcript of court proceedings, which should be
made available to the prosecution and defense in a timely manner so that
they can prepare an appeal. Sufficient time must be allocated to all parties to
raise specific allegations of factual or legal error. The Appeals Chamber
decision must sufficiently address each legal and factual issue raised in a
detailed manner. The time required to compose the Appeals Chamber deci-
sion should be sufficient to prepare the opinion and must not be driven by
external political or emotional factors unrelated to the facts of the case.
Lesson #9: Domestic war crimes tribunals must make gender justice a
priority.
Domestic war crimes tribunals should ensure fair representation of
women judges, prosecutors, and other staff. They must also include indi-
viduals in the registry (including victims and witnesses units), chambers,
and prosecution offices with legal expertise in sexual and gender violence,
as well as expertise in trauma related to crimes of sexual violence. Such
2006-2007]
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provisions recognize the fact that many of the victims of war crimes and
related atrocities are women, and that women jurists, prosecutors, and other
court staff bring important perspectives to the gender crimes that tribunals
should prosecute.
War crimes tribunals are designed not only to prosecute the leaders
of regimes that have engaged in mass violations of humanitarian law, but
also to serve as a model for a newly-emerging judicial system by employing
international rules for the protection of the rights of the defendant and stan-
dards of due process. They should also serve as a model of gender equality
by appointing women to serve visible roles as judges, prosecutors, and other
prominent positions. Domestic war crimes tribunals should disclose the
gender representation of each trial bench, along with other basic information
about the qualifications and experience of the judges (but not put them at
risk by disclosing their identities). The same should be disclosed with re-
gard to the prosecution office, registry, and defense bar. Just as it is impor-
tant that women serve as prominent members of government, so too should
women participate prominently in war crimes tribunals. Before and during
trials, domestic war crimes tribunals should also provide for judges, prose-
cutors, and other tribunal players training sessions on gender sensitivity and
dealing with sexual violence. Efforts must be made to insure that such tri-
bunals provide an enabling environment for victims of sexual violence be-
fore and during their testimony and keep victims of sexual violence in-
formed about court proceedings thereafter. Prosecutors and investigating
judges must make prosecuting and investigating gender crimes a priority
from the outset.
Holding perpetrators of mass violations against women accountable
for their acts has been a slow and tortuous process. Experience has shown
that including women judges in war crimes tribunals particularly makes a
difference. Tribunals should implement creative and proactive ways of en-
couraging a local populace to support war crimes trials, rather than conclud-
ing that said society is "just not ready for this." Outreach to women in the
diaspora should also be considered where it may be thought to be particu-
larly difficult to enlist local women in visible roles. While gender parity and
justice is never convenient, it is a fundamental aspect for lasting and credi-
ble justice.
Lesson # 10: Domestic war crimes tribunals must make effective public
outreach a priority.
Domestic war crimes tribunals should create a public outreach of-
fice to provide regular briefings on the court and trial developments. Not
only would this enhance public knowledge about court proceedings, it
would impede the constant speculation, misinformation, and rumors that so
often overwhelm high-profile trials. The IHT failed to create an effective
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public outreach office. Consequently, Iraqi citizens and the international
community were essentially left to use their imaginations when judging the
tribunal's proceedings. As evidenced by the decision to televise the pro-
ceedings, the IHT was designed in part to serve an educative function. But
the procedural decisions of the IHT were usually shrouded in mystery, as
little attempt was made to clarify the many public misconceptions as they
arose during the Duj ail trial. If the Iraqi people are ever going to feel owner-
ship over the HIT proceedings and if the international community is ever
going to accept the tribunal as legitimate and fair, they need to fully under-
stand what is going on in the courtroom, and the message should not have to
be filtered through the press.
To remedy this problem in the future, the presiding judge should
explain procedural decisions in open court, even if this is not traditionally
done in Iraqi trials. Where decisions are made in closed sessions, explana-
tion for going into closed session should be given in open court, and a
summary of what occurred in the closed session should also be delivered in
open court after closed session. In addition, the HIT should appoint an ex-
perienced lawyer or experienced journalist with a legal background to head
the Public Outreach Office (a role eventually undertaken by the chief inves-
tigating judge Ra'id). The IHT Public Outreach Officer should issue an of-
ficial statement every day of the trial (in both Arabic and, where resources
allow in, English and/or French), explaining what went on that day and an-
swering the questions that the public and press are likely to have about the
day's proceedings. Such official press statements, together with trial exhib-
its, transcripts, budgets, annual reports, and other court documents, should
be posted (in both Arabic and, where resources allow, in English and/or
French) on the tribunal's website on a daily basis for worldwide viewing.
Domestic war crimes tribunals should also run public service an-
nouncements on local and international television and radio, hold town hall
meetings via the radio, the tribunal website, and where security permits
throughout the country. They should develop a media program with work-
shops, bringing in selected domestic and international journalists to cover
the tribunal and its trials. They should prepare, publish, and disseminate to
key stakeholders and the public a handbook titled "what you need to know
about the [domestic] war crimes tribunal." Public outreach should focus not
only on the particulars of the day to day proceedings, but also on the impor-
tance of the right to a fair trial, and the presumption of innocence until
proven guilty.
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